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7.1    Introduction
China—and Chinese economic policy—has loomed large on the global 
economic stage in recent years. Yet, even as arguments over the normalcy of 
the Chinese trade balance and the value of the Chinese currency continue, 
there is substantial debate in both academic and policy circles surrounding 
what the determinants of these variables are.
Interestingly, there are very few studies that simultaneously assess the 
Chinese exchange rate and trade/current account balance. This is partly 
an outcome of the peculiar characteristics of the Chinese economy. In this 
study, we attempt to inform the debate over the interactions between the 
exchange rate and the current account by recourse to two key methodologies. 
First, we identify the equilibrium real exchange rate from the standpoint of 
cross-  country studies. Second, we attempt to obtain more precise estimates 
of Chinese trade elasticities, both on a multilateral and bilateral (with the 
United States) basis. In doing so, we hope to transcend the current limited 
debate based upon rules of thumb.
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1. See Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007a) for discussion of various issues related to the trans-
formation of the Chinese economy.
To anticipate our results, we obtain several interesting ﬁ  ndings. First, the 
renminbi (RMB) was substantially below the value predicted by our cross-
  country estimates (although that conclusion does not survive the advent of 
revised data). The economic magnitude of the misalignment is substantial—
on the order of 50 percent in log terms. However, we also ﬁ  nd that the 
misalignment is typically not statistically signiﬁ  cant, in the sense of being 
more than 1 standard error away from the conditional mean. Moreover, 
substantial revisions to the underlying data provide even more reason to be 
circumspect about estimates of currency misalignment.
Second, we ﬁ  nd that Chinese multilateral trade ﬂ  ows do respond to rela-
tive prices—as represented by a trade-  weighted exchange rate—but that 
that relationship is not always precisely estimated. In addition, the direction 
of eﬀects is diﬀerent than expected a priori. For instance, we ﬁ  nd that Chi-
nese ordinary imports rise in response to a RMB depreciation. However, 
Chinese exports do appear to respond to RMB depreciation in the expected 
manner, as long as a supply variable is included. So, in this sense, Chinese 
trade is not exceptional.
Furthermore, Chinese trade with the United States appears to behave in 
a standard manner—especially after the expansion in the Chinese manu-
facturing capital stock is accounted for. Thus, the China- U.S. trade balance 
should respond to real exchange rate and relative income movements in 
the anticipated manner. However, in neither the case of multilateral nor 
bilateral trade ﬂ  ows should one expect quantitatively large eﬀects arising 
from exchange rate changes. And, of course, our results are not informative 
with regard to the question of how a change in the RMB U.S. dollar (USD) 
exchange rate would aﬀect the overall U.S. trade deﬁ  cit.
Finally, we highlight the fact that considerable uncertainty surrounds both 
our estimates of RMB misalignment and the responsiveness of trade ﬂ  ows 
to movements in exchange rates and output levels. In particular, our results 
for trade elasticities are sensitive to econometric speciﬁ  cation, accounting 
for supply eﬀects, and the inclusion of time trends.
7.2      Placing Matters in Perspective
A discussion of the Chinese economy, and its interaction with the global 
economy, is necessarily complicated, in large part because of its recent—
and incomplete—transition from a central command economy to a market 
economy.1
Take, for instance, the proper measure of the exchange rate in both nomi-
nal and real terms, the central relative prices in any open macroeconomy. China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 3 3
Figure 7.1 depicts the oﬃcial bilateral value of the Chinese currency over the 
last twenty years. Taking the standard approach in the crisis early warning 
system literature, one can calculate the extent of exchange rate overvaluation 
as a deviation from a trend. Adopting this approach in the case of China 
would not lead to a very satisfactory result. Consider ﬁ  rst what a simple 
examination of the bilateral real exchange rate between the United States 
and the RMB implies. In ﬁ  gure 7.1, the rate is expressed so higher values 
constitute a weaker Chinese currency. Over the entire sample period, the 
RMB has experienced a downward trend in value.
However, as with the case with economies experience transitions from 
controlled to partially decontrolled capital accounts and from dual to 
uniﬁ  ed exchange rate regimes, there is some dispute over what exchange 
rate measure to use. In the Chinese case, an argument can be made that, 
with a portion of transactions taking place at swap rates, the 1994 “mega-
 devaluation” was actually better described as a uniﬁ  cation of diﬀerent rates 
of exchange. Figure 7.2 shows the oﬃcial rate (the solid line) at which some 
transactions took place, and a ﬂ  oating rate—often called the “swap- market 
rate”—shown with the thick dashed line. Using a transactions-  weighted 
average of these two rates (called the “adjusted rate”) yields a substantially 
Fig.  7.1  Oﬃcial nominal and real RMB/USD, 1986M01–2008M11
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, and authors’ calculations.234        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
2. See Fernald, Edison, and Loungani (1999) for a discussion in the context of whether the 
1994 “devaluation” caused the 1997 to 1998 currency crises.
diﬀerent proﬁ  le for the RMB’s path, with a substantially diﬀerent (essen-
tially ﬂ  at) trend, as depicted in ﬁ  gure 7.3.2
The trade-  weighted exchange rate is arguably more relevant. Figure 7.4 
depicts the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF)s eﬀective exchange rate 
index (logged) and a linear trend estimated over the available sample of 
1986- 2008M09. Following the methodology outlined in Chinn (2000a), Che-
ung, Chinn, and Fujii (2009a) test for cointegration of the nominal (trade 
weighted) exchange rate and the relative price level. We ﬁ  nd that there is evi-
dence for cointegration of these two variables, with the posited coeﬃcients. 
This means that we can use this trend line as a statistically valid indication of 
the mean value, which the real exchange rate series reverts to. Interestingly, 
repeating this procedure for the more recent period yields a 14.2 percent 
overvaluation in 2008M09.
It is obviously an understatement to say that the Chinese current and trade 
accounts have elicited substantial interest in policy and academic circles over 
the past few years, in part because of the apparent break in the behavior of 
these ﬂ  ows. Figure 7.5 shows the current account balance expressed in dollar 
Fig.  7.2  Oﬃcial and “swap” RMB/USD rate, 1986M01–2007M06
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and Fernald, Edison, and Loungani (1999).China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 3 5
3. Chinn and Ito’s analysis is based upon the Chinn and Prasad (2003) approach to estimating 
the “normal” level of a current account balance, using as fundamentals the budget balance, per 
capita income, demographic variables, and various other control variables.
4. Although the gap has increased in recent years, with the current account exceeding the 
trade balance as income on China’s increasing foreign exchange reserves oﬀsets income pay-
ments to a greater and greater extent.
terms and as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). Clearly, the Chinese 
current account balance has ballooned in recent years, sparking the debate 
over the “normalcy” and propriety of a large emerging market running such 
a large surplus. Of course, normalcy is in the eye of the beholder. Chinn 
and Ito (2007) argue that China’s current account surplus over the 2000 to 
2004 period—while exceeding the predicted value—was within the statisti-
cal margin of error, according to a model of the current account based upon 
the determinants of saving and investment.3
The current account balance is driven largely by the trade balance.4 Figure 
7.6 shows the trade balance in dollar terms. Until about 2004, the Chinese 
trade account was in rough balance, with deﬁ  cits against other countries 
oﬀsetting a trade surplus with the United States.
This brings us to one interesting aspect of the Chinese experience—the 
Fig. 7.3    Adjusted nominal and real RMB/USD, 1986M01–2008M11
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics, Fernald, Edison, and Loungani (1999), and 
authors’ calculations.236        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
5. Note that in this ﬁ  gure, we have used the Chinese measure of the China-  U.S. trade bal-
ance, which diﬀers from the U.S. measure, due to both diﬀerences in valuation measures and 
treatment of reexports via Hong Kong.
fact that such a large portion of the Chinese surplus is accounted for by the 
United States. Figure 7.6 also shows the bilateral surplus with the United 
States, highlighting the fact that the behavior of overall Chinese trade bal-
ances diﬀers substantially from that of the China-  U.S. trade balance.5 This 
divergence reﬂ  ects in part China’s role in the global supply chain.
It is because of this disjuncture between some of the measures of equilib-
rium exchange rates and the behavior of the external accounts that we adopt 
the procedure of examining ﬁ  rst a model of the equilibrium exchange rate, 
and then—taking the exchange rate as largely exogenous—estimating the 
responsiveness of trade ﬂ  ows to the various macroeconomic variables in a 
partial equilibrium framework.
Fig. 7.4    Log trade-  weighted real RMB exchange rate, 1986M01–2008M11, and 
linear time trend
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and authors’ calculations. Pre- 1994 data from 
March 2007 International Financial Statistics.China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 3 7
7.3      The Chinese Equilibrium Exchange Rate
7.3.1      An Overview of Approaches
Several surveys have compared the estimates of the degree to which the 
RMB is misaligned. The Government Accountability Oﬃce (2005) provides 
a comparison of the academic and policy literature, while Cairns (2005b) 
brieﬂ  y surveys recent point estimates obtained by diﬀerent analysts. Here, 
we review the literature to focus primarily on the economic and econometric 
distinctions associated with the various analyses. We also restrict our atten-
tion to those studies conducted in recent years.
Many of these papers fall into familiar categories, either relying upon 
some form of relative purchasing power parity (PPP) or cost competitive-
ness calculation, the modeling of deviations from absolute PPP, a composite 
model incorporating several channels of eﬀects (sometimes called “behav-
ioral equilibrium exchange rate models”), or ﬂ  ow equilibrium models. Table 
7.1 provides a typology of these approaches, further disaggregated by the 
data dimension (cross-  section, time series, or both).
The relative PPP comparisons are the easiest to make, in terms of cal-
culations. However, relative PPP in levels requires the cointegration of the 
Fig. 7.5    Current account balance (in billions of U.S. dollars, left scale) and current 
account-  GDP ratio (right scale)
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 2008).
Note: Statistics for 2008 are IMF projections.238        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
relevant price indexes with the nominal exchange rate (or, equivalently, the 
stationarity of the real exchange rate), but these conditions do not necessar-
ily hold and are seldom tested for. Wang (2004) reports some IMF estimates 
of unit labor cost-  deﬂ  ated RMB. This series has appreciated in real terms 
since 1997; of course, this comparison, like all other comparisons based 
upon indexes, depends upon selecting a year that is deemed to represent 
equilibrium. Selecting a year before 1992 would imply that the RMB has 
depreciated over time.
Bosworth (2004), Frankel (2006), Coudert and Couharde (2005), and 
Cairns (2005b) estimate the relationship between the deviation from abso-
lute PPP and relative per capita income. All obtain similar results regarding 
the relationship between the two variables, although Coudert and Couharde 
fail to detect this link for the RMB.
Wang (2004) and Funke and Rahn (2007) implement what could broadly 
be described as behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) speciﬁ  ca-
tions. These models incorporate a variety of channels through which the 
real exchange rate is aﬀected. Because each author selects diﬀerent variables 
to include, the implied misalignments will necessarily vary, as discussed in 
Dunaway et al. (2009) as well as McCown, Pollard, and Weeks (2007).
Fig. 7.6    Trade balance and bilateral China-  U.S. trade balance, in billions of U.S. 
dollars at annual rates
Sources: CEIC, BEA/Census via Haver, and authors’ calculations.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.240        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
6. In addition, such ﬂ  ow-  based measures must be conditioned on the existence of capital 
controls, the durability and eﬀectiveness of which must necessarily be a matter of judgment.
A diﬀerent set of approaches eschews the price-  based approaches and 
views the current account as the residual of savings and investment behavior. 
The equilibrium exchange rate is derived from the implied medium-  term 
current account using import and export elasticities. In the IMF’s macro-
economic approach, the norms are estimated. Coudert and Couharde (2005) 
implement a closely related approach for China.
A ﬁ  nal set of approaches, popular in the policy arena, focuses on the per-
sistent components of the balance of payments (Goldstein 2004; Bosworth 
2004). This last set of approaches—what we will term the “external accounts 
approach”—is perhaps most useful for conducting short- term analyses. But 
the wide dispersion in implied misalignments reﬂ  ects the diﬃculties in mak-
ing judgments about what constitutes persistent capital ﬂ  ows. For instance, 
Prasad and Wei (2005), examining the composition of capital inﬂ  ows into 
and out of China, argue that much of the reserve accumulation that has 
occurred in the period before the current account surge was due to specula-
tive inﬂ  ow; hence, the degree of misalignment was small. That assessment 
has been viewed as less applicable as the current account balance has surged 
in the past two years.6
Two observations regarding these various estimates are of interest. First, 
as noted by Cairns (2005a), there is an interesting relationship between the 
particular approach adopted by a study and the degree of misalignment 
found. Analyses implementing relative PPP and related approaches indicate 
the least misalignment. Those adopting approaches focusing on the external 
accounts yield estimates that are in the intermediate range. Finally, studies 
implementing an absolute PPP methodology result in the greatest degree of 
estimated undervaluation.
Given that the last approach is the most straightforward in terms of 
implementation, we adopt it, cognizant of the tendency of this approach to 
maximize the estimated extent of misalignment.
7.3.2    A  Framework
The key problem with explaining the Chinese exchange rate and current 
account imbalance is that China deviates substantially from cross-  country 
norms for at least its currency value.
Following Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007b), we exploit a well-  known 
relationship between deviations from absolute PPP and real per capita 
income using panel regression methods. By placing the RMB in the context 
of this well-  known empirical relationship exhibited by a large number of 
developing and developed countries, over a long time horizon, this approach 
addresses the question of where China’s real exchange rate stands relative to China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 4 1
the equilibrium level. In addition to calculating the numerical magnitude of 
the degree of misalignment, we assess the estimates in the context of statisti-
cal uncertainty. In this respect, we extend the standard practice of consider-
ing both economic and statistical signiﬁ  cance in coeﬃcient estimates to the 
prediction aspect.
The price-  level variable in the Penn World Tables (Summers and Heston 
1991) and other PPP exchange rates attempt to circumvent measurement 
problems arising from heterogeneity in goods baskets across countries by 
using prices (not price indexes) of goods and calculating the aggregate price 
level using the same weights. Assume for the moment that this can be accom-
plished, but that some share of the basket () is nontradable (denoted by N 
subscript), and the remainder is tradable (denoted by T subscript). Then:
(1)  pt  pN,t  (1  )pT,t.
By simple manipulation, one ﬁ  nds that the real exchange rate is given by:
(2)  qt  st  pt  pt ∗  (st  pT,t  p∗
T,t)  (pN,t  pT,t)  (p∗
N,t  p∗
T,t).
Rewriting, and indicating the ﬁ  rst term in parentheses, the intercountry price 
of tradables, as qT,t and the intercountry relative price of nontradables as t 
 (pN,t – pT,t) – (p∗
N,t – p∗
T,t), leads to the following rewriting of equation (2):
(2)  qt  qT,t  t
This expression indicates that the real exchange rate can appreciate as 
changes occur in the relative price of traded goods between countries or as 
the relative price of nontradables rises in one country, relative to another. In 
principle, economic factors can aﬀect one or both.
Models that center on the relative price of nontradables include the 
well-  known approaches of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). In those 
instances, the relative price of nontradables depends upon sectoral produc-
tivity diﬀerentials, as in Hsieh (1982), Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (1999), 
and Chinn (2000b). They also include those approaches that include demand-
 side determinants of the relative price, such as that of De Gregorio and Wolf 
(1994), who observe that if consumption preferences are not homothetic and 
factors are not perfectly free to move intersectorally, changes in per capita 
income may result in shifts in the relative price of nontradables.
This perspective provides the key rationale for the well-  known positive 
cross-  sectional relationship between relative price (the inverse of q, i.e., –q) 
and relative per capita income levels. We exploit this relationship to deter-
mine whether the Chinese currency is undervalued. Obviously, this approach 
is not novel; it has been implemented recently by Frankel (2006) and Coudert 
and Couharde (2005). However, we will expand this approach along several 
dimensions. First, we augment the approach by incorporating the time series 242        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
7. Coudert and Couharde (2005) implement the absolute PPP regression on a cross-  section, 
while their panel estimation relies upon estimating the relationship between the relative price 
level to relative tradables to nontradables price indexes.
8. 0 can take on currency speciﬁ  c values if a ﬁ  xed eﬀects speciﬁ  cation is implemented. 
Similarly, the error term is composed of a currency speciﬁ  c and aggregate error if the pooled 
OLS speciﬁ  cation is dropped. Note that this analysis diﬀers from that in Cheung, Chinn, 
and Fujii (2007b), in that we use an updated and revised data set and exclude China from the 
regression.
9. Because the price levels being used are comparable across countries, in principle there is 
no need to incorporate country-  speciﬁ  c constants as in ﬁ  xed eﬀects or random eﬀects regres-
sions. In addition, ﬁ  xed eﬀects estimates are biased in the presence of serial correlation, which 
is documented in the subsequent analysis.
dimension.7 Second, we explicitly characterize the uncertainty surrounding 
our determinations of currency misalignment. Third, we examine the sta-
bility of the relative price and relative per capita income relationship using 
(a) subsamples of certain country groups and time periods, and (b) control 
variables.
7.3.3      The Basic Bivariate Results: Using the 2007 Vintage Data
We compile a large data set encompassing up to 160 countries over the 
1975 to 2005 period. Most of the data are drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Because some data are missing, the 
panel is unbalanced. The data appendix provides greater detail on the data 
used.
Extending Frankel’s (2006) cross-  section approach, we estimate the real 
exchange rate-  income relationship using a pooled time series cross-  section 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, where all variables are expressed 
in terms relative to the United States;
(3)  rit  0  1yit  uit,
where r  –q is expressed in real terms relative to the U.S. price level, y is per 
capita income also relative to the United States.8 The results are reported in 
the ﬁ  rst two columns of table 7.2, for cases in which we measure relative per 
capita income in either USD exchange rates or PPP-  based exchange rates.
One characteristic of estimating a pooled OLS regression is that it forces 
the intercept term to be the same across countries and assumes that the 
error term is distributed identically over the entire sample. Because this is 
something that should be tested, rather than assumed, we also estimated 
random eﬀects and ﬁ  xed eﬀects regressions. The former assumes that the 
individual speciﬁ  c error is uncorrelated with the right-  hand-  side variables, 
while the latter is eﬃcient when this correlation is nonzero.9
Random eﬀects regressions do not yield substantially diﬀerent results 
from those obtained using pooled OLS. Interestingly, when allowing the 
within and between coeﬃcients to diﬀer, we do ﬁ  nd diﬀering eﬀects. In par-
ticular, with USD-  based per capita GDP, the within eﬀect is much stronger 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.244        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
10. Note that, in addition to diﬀerences in the sample, our estimates diﬀer from Frankel’s in 
that we measure each country’s (logged) real GDP per capita in terms relative to the United 
States rather than in absolute terms.
where output growth is correlated with other variables pushing up currency 
values. This pattern, however, is not present in results derived from the PPP-
  based output data.
Interestingly, the estimated elasticity of the price level with respect to per 
capita income does not appear to be particularly sensitive to measurements 
of per capita income. In all cases, the elasticity estimate is always around 
0.26 to 0.39, which compares favorably with Frankel’s (2006) 1990 and 2000 
year cross-  section estimates of 0.38 and 0.32, respectively.10
One of the key emphases of our analysis is the central role accorded the 
quantiﬁ  cation of the uncertainty surrounding the estimates. That is, in addi-
tion to estimating the economic magnitude of the implied misalignments, 
we also assess whether the implied misalignments are statistically diﬀerent 
from zero. In ﬁ  gure 7.7, we plot the actual and resulting predicted (inverse) 
rates and standard error bands derived from the PPP- based data. The results 
Fig. 7.7    The rate of RMB misalignment based on the pooled OLS estimates with 
the PPP-  based per capita income, 1975–2005
Sources: Chinese 2006 data are from World Economic Outlook. “New China 2005” observa-
tion is based upon 2007 International Comparison Program data.China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 4 5
11. The deviations when using per capita income in USD, rather than PPP, terms are some-
what smaller—55 percent in log terms (42 percent in absolute terms).
pertaining to USD- based per capita GDP data are qualitatively similar and, 
thus, are not reported for brevity.
It is interesting to consider the path that the RMB has traced out ﬁ  gure 
7.7. It begins the sample as overvalued, and over the next three decades, it 
moves toward the predicted equilibrium value and then overshoots, so that 
by 2005 to 2006, it is substantially undervalued by about 60 percent in log 
terms (50 percent in absolute terms).11 It is indeed a puzzle that the RMB 
path is diﬀerent from the one predicted by the Balassa- Samuelson hypothe-
sis. In comparing the observations at 1975 and 2004, we found that countries 
including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore also experienced an increase 
in their income but a decrease in their relative price level. On the other hand, 
Japan—a country typically used to illustrate the Balassa-  Samuelson eﬀect, 
has a positive relative price level—income relationship. We reserve further 
analysis for future study.
In this context, we make two observations about these estimated misalign-
ments. First, the RMB has been persistently undervalued by this criterion 
since the mid-  1980s, even in 1997 and 1998, when China was lauded for its 
refusal to devalue its currency despite the threat to its competitive posi-
tion.
Second, and perhaps most important, in 2005, the RMB was more than 1 
standard error—but less than 2 standard errors—away from the predicted 
value, which in the present context is interpreted as the “equilibrium” value. 
In other words, by the standard statistical criterion that applied economists 
commonly appeal to, the RMB is not undervalued (as of 2005) in a statisti-
cally signiﬁ  cant sense. Similarly, we could not assert that the estimated degree 
of undervaluation is statistically signiﬁ  cant in 2006. The wide dispersion of 
observations in the scatter plots should give pause to those who would make 
strong statements regarding the exact degree of misalignment.
In Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007b), we extended this analysis to allow 
for heterogeneity across country groupings (industrial versus less- developed, 
high versus low, and regional) and time periods. After conducting various 
robustness checks, we conclude that although the point estimates indicate 
the RMB is undervalued in almost all samples, in almost no case is the devia-
tion statistically signiﬁ  cant, and indeed, when serial correlation is accounted 
for, the extent of misalignment is not even statistically signiﬁ  cant at the 50 
percent level. These ﬁ  ndings highlight the great degree of uncertainty sur-
rounding empirical estimates of equilibrium real exchange rates, thereby 
underscoring the diﬃculty in accurately assessing the degree of RMB under-
valuation.
Notice that the deviations from the conditional mean are persistent; that 
is, deviations from the real exchange rate-  income relationship identiﬁ  ed by 246        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
12. The discussant, Jeﬀrey Frankel, has observed that the 5 percent signiﬁ  cance level might 
be too high a hurdle to jump for policy purposes. Even when reducing the signiﬁ  cance levels 
to 40 percent, we would not reject the no-  undervalation null hypothesis, after accounting for 
serial correlation.
13. Statistics are from Asian Development Bank (2007). See also Elekdag and Lall (2008) 
and International Comparison Program (2007) for discussion.
the regression are persistent or exhibit serial correlation. This has an impor-
tant implication for interpreting the degree of uncertainty surrounding these 
measures of misalignment. Frankel (2006) makes a similar observation, not-
ing that half of the deviation of the RMB from the 1990 conditional mean 
exists in 2000. We estimate the autoregressive coeﬃcient in our sample at 
approximately 0.95 (derived from PPP-  based per capita income ﬁ  gures) on 
an annual basis. A simple, ad hoc adjustment based upon the latter estimate 
suggests that the standard error of the regression should be adjusted upward 
by a factor equal to [1/(1 – 	 ˆ2)]0.5 ≈ 3. After controlling for serial correlation, 
the actual value of the RMB is always within 1 standard error prediction 
interval surrounding the (predicted) equilibrium value in the last twenty 
plus years! Combining this result and the large data dispersion observed in 
ﬁ  gure 7.7, it is clear that the data are not suﬃciently informative for making 
a sharp inferences regarding misalignment—not just for the recent period 
but for the entire sample period.12
7.3.4    The  Basic  Speciﬁ  cation Updated: The 2008 Vintage Data
Recently, the World Bank reported new estimates of China’s GDP and 
price level in 2005, measured in PPP terms. These estimates, based on the 
International Comparison Project’s work, incorporated new benchmark 
data on prices. The end result was to reduce China’s estimated GDP per 
capita by about 40 percent and increase the estimated price level by the same 
amount.13 Using the updated data, one ﬁ  nds that China’s 2005 observation 
lying essentially on the regression line, highlighted as “New China 2005” in 
ﬁ  gure 7.7. In other words, the new estimates erase our estimated undervalu-
ation.
However, taking proper account of this issue involves a slightly more 
involved approach. This is because data for many other countries were sub-
stantially revised as well. This means that we need to reestimate the regres-
sions. We report these results in table 7.3.
Focusing on the PPP-  based data, one ﬁ  nds that the pooled OLS results 
indicate a smaller impact of income on relative price levels than obtained 
using the earlier data. The coeﬃcient drops from 0.3 to 0.2. In ﬁ  xed eﬀects 
regressions, the between coeﬃcient drops, while the within rises. Given the 
change in the sample period and the change in the estimated coeﬃcients, one 
would not be too surprised to ﬁ  nd the estimated misalignments change. How-
ever, the magnitude of the change in the implied misalignment for the RMB 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.248        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
14. We also estimated equation (3) using the year-  by-  year cross-  section regression method. 
The implied pattern of RMB misalignment is comparable with the one discussed in the preced-
ing. For instance, RMB is found to be overvalued before the 1980s, display a large amount of 
undervaluation from the late 1980s to 2004, and be slightly overvalued in 2005. All these year-
 by- year cross- section estimates of the degree of undervaluation are not statistically signiﬁ  cant. 
The average of these year-  by-  year undervaluation estimates from 1975 to 2005 is 15.5 percent. 
The value is similar to the undervaluation estimate of 16 percent reported in Arvind Subra-
manian (2008), who obtains his estimate based upon the methodology outlined in Johnson, 
Ostry, and Subramanian (2007). We believe utilizing panel regression—as we do—and focus-
ing speciﬁ  cally on the most recent period provides a more accurate assessment of the current 
degree of currency misalignment.
15. We have not controlled for additional eﬀects in these regressions. However, our basic 
results do not change with the inclusion of other variables including demographics and insti-
tutional factors. See Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2009b).
either the economic or statistical sense. The undervaluation is on the order of 
10 percent in log terms, and the maximal undervaluation is in 1993.14
This outcome is clearly illustrated in ﬁ  gure 7.8, where we present the scat-
terplot of the price level against per capita income but utilizing the most 
recent data. These ﬁ  gures summarize our basic ﬁ  nding: namely that the 
substantial misalignment—on the order of 40 percent—detected in our 
previous analysis disappears in this analysis.15
Fig. 7.8    The rate of RMB misalignment based on the pooled OLS estimates with 
the PPP-  based per capita income, 2008 vintage dataChina’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 4 9
16. O’Neill and Wilson (2003) as cited in Morrison and Labonte (2006).
One might take this development as justiﬁ  cation for our earlier conclu-
sions that the statistical evidence for undervaluation was misplaced. How-
ever, our conﬁ  dence bands were drawn based upon sampling uncertainty. 
The revision in China’s position reﬂ  ects measurement error, which we did 
not take into account in our previous analysis.
The seemingly ephemeral nature of our undervaluation estimate rein-
forces the point that we have only investigated one approach of the several 
laid out in table 7.1. Our discussant has observed that other indicators also 
inform the debate over whether the RMB is misaligned. The burgeoning 
trade surplus and reserves accumulation, as well as the rapid growth rate 
(exceeding what is widely perceived as the sustainable rate), point to an 
undervalued currency, at least conditional upon the level of other policy 
variables.
We would not disagree with the view that multiple approaches should be 
used to assess currency misalignment. In that respect, we have somewhat 
more evidence for RMB undervaluation than one would gain from merely 
looking at the Penn eﬀect, especially as the revised PPP data have cast into 
doubt our estimates of misalignment.
Nonetheless, to the extent that almost all such estimates indicate quanti-
tatively substantial undervaluation, and sustained deviation from the price 
line, we are willing to consider the possibility that the real rate can be con-
trolled for sustained periods of time. Taking the real exchange rate as some-
what exogenous, we can then plausibly consider the eﬀects of changes in the 
RMB’s value on Chinese trade ﬂ  ows.
7.4      A Closer Look at Trade Elasticities
7.4.1      Survey of Trade Elasticity Estimates
The extant literature documenting the price and income responsiveness of 
Chinese trade ﬂ  ows is relatively small, and given the rapid pace of structural 
transformation, some of the earlier studies spanning the transition period 
is of limited relevance.
With respect to Chinese multilateral trade elasticities, there are few aca-
demic studies. One widely cited estimate from Goldman Sachs is for a Chi-
nese export price elasticity of 0.2 and an import price elasticity of 0.5.16 Pre-
sumably, similar estimates underlie Goldstein’s (2004) calculations although 
they are not reported.
Kwack et al. (2007) uses a gravity model augmented with a Consumer 
Price Index (CPI)- deﬂ  ated real exchange rate to estimate elasticities over the 
1984 to 2003 period. Using a panel of twenty- nine developed and developing 250        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
17. Wang and Ji (2006) adopt a related approach and ﬁ  nd essentially zero eﬀect of nominal 
exchange rates on Chinese imports and exports.
18. Marquez and Schindler (2007) conjecture that this counterintuitive result arises from 
the role of state-  owned enterprises. They also observe that this result can occur under certain 
conﬁ  gurations of substitutability between imported and domestic goods.
countries, they obtain a Chinese multilateral import price elasticity of 0.50 
and an income elasticity of 1.57.17
Thorbecke and Smith (forthcoming) do not directly examine the impli-
cations for both imports and exports, but do focus on the impact of RMB 
appreciation on exports, taking into account the integration of the produc-
tion chain in the region. Using a sample of thirty-  three countries over the 
1994 to 2005 period and a trade-  weighted exchange rate that measures the 
impact of how bilateral exchange rates aﬀect imported input prices, they 
ﬁ  nd that a 10 percent RMB appreciation in the absence of changes in other 
East Asian currencies would result in a 3 percent decline in processed exports 
and an 11 percent decline in ordinary exports. If other East Asian currencies 
appreciated in line with the RMB, then the resulting change in the processed 
exports would be 9 percent.
Marquez and Schindler (2007) argue that the absence of useful price 
indexes for Chinese imports and exports requires the adoption of an alterna-
tive model speciﬁ  cation. They treat the variable of interest as world (import 
or export) trade shares, broken down into “ordinary” and “parts and com-
ponents.” Using monthly Chinese imports data from 1997 to July 2006, they 
ﬁ  nd ordinary trade-  share income elasticities ranging from –0.021 to –0.001 
(i.e., the coeﬃcients are in the wrong direction), and price elasticities from 
0.013 to 0.021.18 The parts and components price elasticities are in the wrong 
direction and statistically signiﬁ  cantly so. Interestingly, the stock of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) matters in almost all cases. Because the FDI stock 
is a smooth trend, it is not clear whether to attribute the eﬀect explicitly to 
the eﬀect of FDI or to other variables that may be trending upward over 
time, including productive capacity.
For export shares (ordinary goods), they ﬁ  nd income elasticities ranging 
from 0.08 to 0.09 and price elasticities ranging from 0.08 to 0.068. For parts 
and components export share, the income coeﬃcient ranges from a 0.042 to 
0.049. Their preferred speciﬁ  cation implies that a 10 percent real apprecia-
tion of the Chinese RMB reduces the Chinese trade balance between $75 
billion and $92 billion.
Garcia-  Herrero and Koivu (2007) come closest to our approach. They 
examine data over the 1995 to 2005 period, breaking the data into ordinary 
and processing/parts imports and exports. They relate Chinese exports to 
the world imports and the real eﬀective exchange rate, augmented by a proxy 
measure for the value added tax rebate on exports and a capacity utilization 
variable. In both import and export equations, the stock of FDI is included. China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 5 1
19. Mann and Plück (2007) use disaggregate U.S. trade ﬂ  ow and price index data from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The reported income elasticities are for matched expen-
diture series, for example, investment activity as the income variable in a regression involving 
capital goods.
One notable result they obtain is that for Chinese imports, the real exchange 
rate coeﬃcient has a sign opposite of anticipated in the full sample.
Another particularly interesting result they obtain is that post-  World 
Trade Organization (WTO) entry, Chinese income and price elasticities for 
exports rise considerably. On the import side, no such change is obvious with 
respect to the pre-   and post-  WTO period.
In the bilateral vein, Mann and Plück (2007) investigate China- U.S. trade. 
Using an error correction model speciﬁ  cation applied to disaggregate bilat-
eral data over the 1980 to 2004 period, they ﬁ  nd extremely high income 
elasticities for U.S. imports from China: for capital and consumer goods, the 
estimated long-  run income elasticities are 10 and 4, respectively. The con-
sumer good price elasticity is not statistically signiﬁ  cant, while the capital 
good elasticity is implausibly high, around 10.19 On the other hand, U.S. 
exports to China have a relatively low income elasticity of 0.74 and 2.25 for 
capital and consumer goods, respectively. The price elasticity estimates are 
not statistically signiﬁ  cant. In general, they have diﬃculty obtaining sensible 
coeﬃcient estimates.
Thorbecke (2006) examines aggregate bilateral U.S.-  China data over the 
1988 to 2005 period. Using both the Johansen maximum likelihood method 
as well as Stock and Watson’s (1993) dynamic OLS methodology, he ﬁ  nds 
statistically signiﬁ  cant evidence of cointegration between incomes, real 
exchange rates, and CPI-  deﬂ  ated trade ﬂ  ows.
U.S. imports from China have a real exchange rate elasticity ranging from 
0.4 to 1.28 (depending upon the number of leads and lags in the dynamic 
ordinary least squares [DOLS] speciﬁ  cation). The income elasticity ranges 
between 0.26 to 4.98. In all instances, substitution with Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) trade ﬂ  ows is accounted for by the inclusion 
of an ASEAN/dollar real exchange rate. Interestingly, the income elastici-
ties are not statistically signiﬁ  cant, even when quantitatively large. For U.S. 
exports to China, he obtains exchange rate elasticities ranging from 0.42 to 
2.04, and income elasticities ranging from 1.05 to 1.21.
7.4.2    Multilateral  Trade  Elasticities
First, let us consider Chinese trade ﬂ  ows with respect to the rest of the 
world. We estimate the following equations, where the designations import 
and export are from the Chinese perspective,
(4) ext  0  1yt∗  2qt  3zt  u1,t,
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where y is an activity variable, q is a real exchange rate (deﬁ  ned convention-
ally, so that a rise is a depreciation), and z is a supply-  side variable. The 
variable w is a shift variable accounting for other factors that might increase 
import demand. The equations are estimated using the Stock- Watson (1993) 
dynamic OLS regression method with two leads and lags of ﬁ  rst diﬀerences 
of the right-  hand-  side variables.
For the dependent variables, we have collected data on Chinese exports 
and imports from as early as 1980, to 2006, on a monthly basis. These data 
are in turn broken into ordinary and processing and parts trade ﬂ  ows. The 
multilateral data is sourced from Chinese Customs via CEIC. Import data 
are on a cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) basis, while export data are free 
on board (f.o.b.). We convert the monthly data into quarterly by simple 
averaging. These series are depicted in ﬁ  gures 7.9 and 7.10.
One particularly diﬃcult issue involves price deﬂ  ators. Until 2005, the 
Chinese did not report price indexes for imports and exports. This limitation 
explains Marquez and Schindler’s (2007) reliance on a trade share variable. 
We attempt to circumvent this diﬃculty in a diﬀerent manner, by relying on 
several proxy measures. Because the trade ﬂ  ows are reported in U.S. dollars, 
Fig. 7.9    Chinese total, ordinary, and processing and parts exports, in billions of 
U.S. dollars, at annual ratesChina’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 5 3
the price measures we consider include the U.S. CPI- all, the PPI for ﬁ  nished 
goods, the price indexes reported by Gaulier, Lemoine, and Ünal-  Kesenci 
(2006, hereafter GLÜ-  K), both at the aggregate level, and by stage of pro-
duction, and, ﬁ  nally, using the Hong Kong reexport indexes.
In the following, we report only the results based upon the PPI, the 
category- speciﬁ  c GLÜ-  K indexes, and the Hong Kong unit value indexes; 
the remaining results are available upon request. We select these indexes 
(shown in ﬁ  gures 7.11 and 7.12) mostly on the grounds of pragmatism. The 
PPI appears to be a good proxy for tradable goods prices, while the GLÜ- K 
indexes are carefully constructed and documented.
The Hong Kong unit value indexes have typically been used in empirical 
analyses as proxy measures for Chinese trade (see Cheung 2005). We use the 
Hong Kong to China reexport unit value indexes to deﬂ  ate Chinese imports 
and the Hong Kong to U.S. reexport unit value indexes to deﬂ  ate Chinese 
exports.
The GLÜ-  K indexes have the drawback of being available only at the 
annual frequency, and then only up to 2004. We have used quadratic inter-
polation to translate the annual data into quarterly.
Our measure of the real exchange rate, q, is the IMF’s CPI- deﬂ  ated trade-
Fig. 7.10    Chinese total, ordinary, and processing and parts imports, in billions of 
U.S. dollars, at annual rates254        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
  weighted index. For y∗, we use rest-  of-  the-  world GDP evaluated in current 
U.S. dollars, deﬂ  ated into real terms using the U.S. GDP deﬂ  ator, while y is 
measured using real GDP (production based) expressed in real 1990 RMB. 
For z, we assume that supply shifts out with the capital stock in manufactur-
ing (Chinn 2005). This capital stock measure was calculated by Bai, Hsieh, 
and Qian (2006). This series is extended by assuming a 12 percent growth 
rate in 2005 and 2006, and interpolated to quarterly frequency using qua-
dratic match averaging.
In table 7.4, we present the results for Chinese exports, with panel A for 
aggregate ﬂ  ows, panel B for ordinary exports, and panel C for parts and 
processing. For each ﬂ  ow, we present coeﬃcient estimates pertaining to 
real trade ﬂ  ows calculated using alternative deﬂ  ators. The results in column 
(1) pertain to PPI-  deﬂ  ated series, while those in column (2) pertain to that 
obtained when deﬂ  ating with the GLÜ-  K price series, and column (3) per-
tains to Hong Kong reexport unit value index-  deﬂ  ated series. For now, the 
z term is suppressed.
There are two uniformly consistent results in all the regression results 
reported in table 7.4. First, the income variable enters in with a very high 
(perhaps implausibly high) and statistically signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcient. Second, 
Fig.  7.11  Deﬂ  ators for Chinese exports
Sources: U.S. PPI, consumption good-  based price index from Gaulier, Lemoine, and Ünal- 
Kesenci (2006) and Hong Kong reexport to world unit value index.
Note: All series in logs, rescaled to 2000Q1 0.China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 5 5
20. In these, and subsequent, estimates, the inclusion of a time trend often results in substan-
tially diﬀerent point estimates for the income elasticity. This outcome occurs because Chinese 
GDP and rest-  of-  the-  world GDP look similar to a deterministic time trend.
21. Here we have adjusted the oﬃcial rate to reﬂ  ect the fact that many transactions took 
place through swap centers during the period leading up to 1994. See Fernald, Edison, and 
Loungani (1999).
the real exchange rate enters in with a strongly negative sign—that is, greater 
RMB depreciation induces less exports.20
Because these results seem so counterintuitive, we appeal to a supply shift 
variable. The standard imperfect goods model of imports and exports typi-
cally relies upon the real exchange rate index measuring the relative price of 
traded goods well. However, our exchange rate measure is the CPI-  deﬂ  ated 
exchange rate, which may or may not be a good measure of relative traded 
goods prices.21 Hence, we add in a measure of the supply side. In line with 
the approach adopted in Helkie and Hooper (1988), we use a measure of 
the Chinese capital stock in manufacturing.
The results using this supply variable are quite interesting. As reported 
in table 7.5, the supply variable coeﬃcient is now the only one that is con-
sistently signiﬁ  cant. In addition, the income and price coeﬃcients now take 
Fig.  7.12  Deﬂ  ators for Chinese imports
Sources: U.S. PPI, capital good-  based price index from Gaulier, Lemoine, and Ünal-  Kesenci 
(2006) and Hong Kong reexport to China unit value index.
Note: All series in logs, rescaled to 2000Q1 0.256        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
on more plausible coeﬃcients, even though they are often not statistically 
signiﬁ  cant.
In panel A, overall exports are examined. The only statistically signiﬁ  -
cant coeﬃcients are on the supply variable. Of course, as suggested by 
Marquez and Schindler (2007), the diﬀering behavior of ordinary and pro-
cessing exports suggests that aggregation is inappropriate. Panel B reports 
the results for ordinary exports. Here, one ﬁ  nds that the rest-  of-  the-  world 
activity is not a good predictor of exports, while the price variable is an 
important determinant. Using either GLÜ-  K or Hong Kong indexes, one 
Table 7.4  Chinese export elasticities
PPI GLÜ- K HK  UV
      (1)   (2)   (3)  
A. Aggregate exports
y∗ 5.23∗∗∗ 5.30∗∗∗ 6.01∗∗∗
(0.29) (1.42) (0.35)
q –1.63∗∗∗ –2.14∗∗∗ –1.69∗∗∗
(0.39) (0.68) (0.47)
z
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.76 0.88
Standard error 0.186 0.272 0.223
Sample 93Q3–06Q2 93Q3–04Q2 93Q3–06Q2
B. Ordinary exports
y∗ 4.98∗∗∗ 4.82∗∗∗ 5.76∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.52) (0.38)
q –1.46∗∗∗ –2.00∗∗∗ –1.51∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.73) (0.50)
z
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.68 0.84
Standard error 0.209 0.293 0.244
Sample 93Q3–06Q2 93Q3–04Q2 93Q3–06Q2
C. Processing and parts exports
y∗ 5.35∗∗∗ 5.14∗∗∗ 6.13∗∗∗
(0.27) (1.15) (0.33)
q –1.86∗∗∗ –2.68∗∗∗ –1.92∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.56) (0.45)
z
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.84 0.90
Standard error 0.171 0.220 0.208
  Sample   93Q3–06Q2   93Q3–04Q2   93Q3–06Q2 
Notes: Point estimates are obtained from dynamic ordinary least squares (2,2). Robust stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses. The price elasticity estimate should be positive for Chi-
nese exports. PPI indicates U.S. producer price index-  ﬁ  nished goods is used as the deﬂ  ator; 
GLÜ-  K indicates the Gaulier, Lemoine, and Ünal-  Kesenci (2006) consumer good index is 
used as the deﬂ  ator; HK UV indicates the Hong Kong unit value index for reexports to the 
world is used as the deﬂ  ator.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.Table 7.5  Chinese export elasticities in the presence of Chinese capital stock
PPI GLÜ- K HK  UV
      (1)   (2)   (3)  
A. Aggregate exports
y∗ 0.57 –0.56 0.31
(0.40) (0.53) (0.40)
q –0.06 0.26 0.27
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22)
z 1.68∗∗∗ 2.35∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15)
Adjusted R2 0.98 0.98 0.99
Standard error 0.077 0.080 0.076
Sample 93Q3–06Q2 93Q3–04Q2 93Q3–06Q2
B. Ordinary exports
y∗ 0.04 –1.26 –0.22
(0.55) (0.75) (0.55)
q 0.31 0.61∗ 0.64∗
(0.32) (0.31) (0.32)
z 1.83∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗ 2.22∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.96 0.97
Standard error 0.106 0.108 0.105
Sample 93Q3–06Q2 93Q3–04Q2 93Q3–06Q2
C. Processing and parts exports
y∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.26 0.72∗∗
(0.30) (0.32) (0.31)
q –0.47∗∗ –0.62∗∗∗ –0.14
(0.19) (0.16) (0.18)
z 1.52∗∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Adjusted R2 0.92 0.99 0.99
Standard error 0.065 0.060 0.062
  Sample   93Q3–06Q2   93Q3–04Q2   93Q3–06Q2 
Notes: Point estimates are obtained from dynamic ordinary least squares (2,2). Robust stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses. The price elasticity estimate should be positive for Chi-
nese exports. PPI indicates U.S. producer price index-  ﬁ  nished goods is used as the deﬂ  ator; 
GLÜ-  K indicates the Gaulier, Lemoine, and Ünal-  Kesenci (2006) consumer good index is 
used as the deﬂ  ator; HK UV indicates the Hong Kong unit value index for reexports to the 
world is used as the deﬂ  ator. Supply is the Bai, Hsieh, and Qian (2006) measure of the Chinese 
capital stock in manufacturing.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
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ﬁ  nds an export elasticity of approximately 0.6. At the same time, a 1 percent 
increase in the Chinese manufacturing capital stock induces between a 2.2 
and 2.5 percent increase in real exports.
Strangely, the rest-  of-  the-  world GDP does aﬀect positively processing 
output. Thorbecke and Smith (forthcoming) argue that Chinese processing 
output is fairly sophisticated in nature; if so, that might explain the greater 
income sensitivity of such exports.
In table 7.6, we turn to examining Chinese imports. We rely upon the 
same breakdown, with panel A pertaining to aggregate imports, panel B to 
ordinary imports, and panel C to processing and parts imports.
Aggregate imports appear to respond strongly to income, and in the 
expected direction. On the other hand, we replicate Marquez and Schindler’s 
(2007) results with regard to the price elasticity. A weaker RMB induces 
greater imports, rather than less. This is true also for ordinary imports. 
Only when moving to parts and processing imports does one obtain some 
mixed evidence, and there the results are still toward ﬁ  nding a wrong- signed 
coeﬃcient.
The Marquez and Schindler (2007) results suggest including a role for 
FDI as our w variable. However, inclusion of a cumulative FDI variable is 
insuﬃcient to overturn this result on a consistent basis.
In panel D of table 7.6, we interpret w as real total exports, in the speci-
ﬁ  cation involving parts and processing imports. Then we obtain a negative 
estimated elasticity for the real exchange rate although the results can hardly 
be considered robust.
Given these mixed results, we have to be very careful in interpreting the 
estimated elasticities until such time as we have a long time series on Chinese 
trade prices.
7.4.3    China-  U.S.  Trade  Elasticities
In order to examine the behavior of the bilateral China-  U.S. trade bal-
ance, it is necessary to modify equations (4) and (5) to take into account the 
substitutability between Chinese goods and goods from competing coun-
tries. The resulting speciﬁ  cations are given by:
(6) ext  0  1yt∗  2qt  3zt  4q ˜t  u3,t,
and





4q ˜t  u4,t,
where qt is the bilateral real exchange rate, and q ˜t is an eﬀective real exchange 
rate relative to China’s other trading partners.
Two sets of bilateral data are obtained; the ﬁ  rst is sourced from the People’s 
Republic of China Customs agency, and the second from U.S. Customs. The 
valuation conventions diﬀer between the Chinese and U.S. data as does the Table 7.6  Chinese import elasticities
PPI GLÜ- K HK  UV
      (1)   (2)   (3)  
A. Aggregate imports
y 1.78∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.04) (0.06)
q 1.48∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 1.54∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.19) (0.32)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.98 0.99
Standard error 0.056 0.050 0.055
Sample 94Q4–06Q2 94Q4–04Q2 94Q4–06Q2
B. Ordinary imports
y 2.16∗∗∗ 2.40∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.32) (0.27)
q 2.75∗∗ 2.25∗∗ 2.80∗∗
(1.18) (1.06) (1.19)
Adjusted R2 0.85 0.94 0.94
Standard error 0.209 0.152 0.196
Sample 94Q4–06Q2 94Q4–04Q2 94Q4–06Q2
C. Processing and parts imports
y 1.68∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.13) (0.06)
q 1.15∗∗∗ –0.25 1.20∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.34) (0.28)
R2 0.98 0.88 0.99
Standard error 0.072 0.080 0.060
Sample 94Q4–06Q2 94Q4–04Q2 94Q4–06Q2
D. Processing and parts imports
y –0.40∗ –1.86∗ –0.04
(0.20) (0.93) (0.25)
q –0.13 –1.64∗∗∗ –0.16
(0.23) (0.58) (0.22)
w 1.10∗∗∗ 1.20∗∗∗ 0.96∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.40) (0.12)
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.89 0.99
Standard error 0.037 0.074 0.035
  Sample   94Q4–06Q2   94Q4–04Q2   94Q4–06Q2 
Notes: Point estimates are obtained from dynamic ordinary least squares (2,2). Robust stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses. The price elasticity estimate should be negative for Chi-
nese imports. PPI indicates U.S. producer price index-  ﬁ  nished goods is used as the deﬂ  ator; 
GLÜ-  K indicates the Gaulier, Lemoine, and Ünal-  Kesenci (2006) capital goods and parts 
index is used as the deﬂ  ator for aggregate, capital goods for ordinary and parts for processing 
and parts; HK UV indicates the Hong Kong unit value index for reexports is used as the deﬂ  a-
tor. The demand shift variable w is total real exports.
∗∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.260        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
coverage. These diﬀerences are discussed in detail by Schindler and Beckett 
(2005). The relevant bilateral series are presented in ﬁ  gures 7.13 and 7.14.
Now y∗ is measured using U.S. real GDP (in chained 2000 dollars). qt is 
calculated by deﬂ  ating the Chinese RMB (taking into account the transac-
tions taking place at swap rates pre-  1994) by the Chinese and U.S. CPI. q ˜t 
is calculated using time- varying trade weights based on Chinese trade ﬂ  ows 
and bilateral real exchange rates calculated using CPIs. In the calculation of 
trade weights, we omitted Hong Kong, due to the diﬃculties in interpreting 
the trade with that economy.
Once again, our chief diﬃculty arises from the absence of an appropri-
ate deﬂ  ator. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reports a price index for 
Chinese imports into the United States starting from 2004 onward, which 
aﬀords a much too short time series for purposes of estimation. While the 
Chinese import price series has tracked the import price index for East Asian 
newly industrializing countries (NICs) over the period that we have Chinese 
statistics, it is clearly inappropriate to use the NICs series going back before 
June 1997 as China did not move its exchange rate with the other East Asian 
countries. Hence, for Chinese exports to the United States, we use a variety 
of proxy measures. The ﬁ  rst is the U.S. PPI for all ﬁ  nished goods. The second 
is a composite measure, that is, the reported U.S. import series for Chinese 
Fig. 7.13    Chinese exports to the United States, in billions of U.S. dollars, at 
annual ratesChina’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 6 1
goods from January 2004 onward, the NICs series from January 2000 to end-
  2003, and the GLÜ-  K consumer goods index from 1992 to end-  1999. The 
third is the Hong Kong unit value index for reexports to the United States.
The BLS does not report a price index for U.S. exports to China. Because 
according to Chinese statistics, over half of Chinese imports from the United 
States are categorized as machinery and electrical equipment in 2006, we 
chose to use as one of our proxies for Chinese import prices, the U.S. capital 
goods export price index, in addition to the U.S. PPI. A ﬁ  nal proxy measure 
is the Hong Kong unit value index for imports from the United States. This 
means there are three deﬂ  ators for each trade ﬂ  ow measure.
The results for Chinese exports are reported in table 7.7. The three left-
  hand-  side columns pertain to results obtained using U.S. data, while the 
three right-  hand-  side columns pertain to results obtained using Chinese 
data. We do not report results omitting the supply shift variable as this leads 
to implausibly high income elasticities.
The estimated income elasticities based on U.S. data are positive but not 
statistically signiﬁ  cant. On the other hand, there is a strong, statistically 
signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcient on the bilateral real exchange rate. In other words, 
as the Chinese currency depreciates against the dollar, Chinese exports to 
the United States increase. In addition, as the Chinese currency depreci-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 6 3
22. For a discussion of the complementary/substituting aspect of Chinese and ASEAN 
trade, see Ahearne et al. (2003).
23. See also the discussion in Fung and Lau (2001).
ates against its trade partners, it gains a larger share of exports—vis-  à-  vis 
ASEAN and other economies—to the United States.22 However, this esti-
mated eﬀect is not particularly large and is nowhere near statistical signiﬁ  -
cance. Finally, the supply shift variable comes in with a large positive and 
statistically signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcient.
Interestingly, when we use Chinese data, we obtain a negative coeﬃcient 
on U.S. income (signiﬁ  cant in one instance). The other results remain 
intact, however. Hence, we can be reasonably conﬁ  dent that the bilateral real 
exchange rate does have an eﬀect on bilateral trade ﬂ  ows.
Which set of estimates should we place more weight on? Because Schin-
dler and Beckett (2005) argue that most of the error in calculating trade 
balances is attributable to China’s inability to identify correctly the desti-
nation of Chinese exports transshipped through Hong Kong, we believe 
the results based on U.S. data are of greater reliability, at least insofar as 
Chinese exports are concerned. For Chinese imports of U.S. goods, Chinese 
data may be more reliable.23
In contrast to the results obtained for Chinese exports to the United 
States, Chinese imports from the United States are relatively well explained 
by Chinese income and—at least for U.S. data—the real exchange rate. Both 
elasticities are statistically signiﬁ  cant and in the anticipated direction when 
using U.S. data. However, the Chinese exchange rate relative to other trading 
partners once again do not enter in with any sort of recognizable pattern. 
Despite the similarity in the time series behavior of the U.S. and Chinese 
data, when the latter are used, the coeﬃcient on the bilateral real exchange 
rate is no longer statistically signiﬁ  cant, nor is the sign negative.
7.4.4      Policy Implications of the Estimates
There are some complications in drawing out the policy implications of 
these regression estimates. First, it is clear that the estimates are not robust 
to speciﬁ  cation. Second, some of the key point estimates are not statistically 
signiﬁ  cant. Third, some of the point estimates—when statistically signiﬁ  -
cant—are counterintuitive. In particular, the results pertaining to import 
elasticities are problematic.
For instance, consider a 10 percent appreciation. Using the point esti-
mates from table 7.5, column three of panels B and C for exports, one ﬁ  nds 
that Chinese real exports (in 2000$) decline from 952.3 billion (recorded in 
2006) to 927.4 in the long run. On the other hand, using column three esti-
mates from panels B and D from table 7.6, one ﬁ  nds that Chinese imports 
also decline, from 581.6 billion to 510.5 billion. This means that the trade 
balance increases from 400.9 billion to 416.9 billion, in response to a 10 264        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
24. See, for instance, Frankel and Wei’s (2007) analysis of determinants of the Treasury’s 
decisions regarding currency manipulators.
percent real appreciation. (Note that parts and processing imports fall as 
total exports rise.)
The ordinary goods import price elasticity estimate of 2.8 drives this 
result. Alternative econometric speciﬁ  cations lead to diﬀerent estimates. 
For instance, using a single equation error correction model, allowing for 
coeﬃcient shifts with Chinese accession to WTO, leads to a statistically 
insigniﬁ  cant estimate of the price elasticity. In the 2000 to 2006 period, the 
implied price elasticity is zero. Using this point estimate, then a 10 percent 
appreciation would actually lead to a shrinkage of the trade balance from 
400.9 billion to 355.2 billion. This estimate of 45.7 billion (2000$) is some-
what less than the $88.6 billion current dollars reported in Marquez and 
Schindler (2007).
Although the China- U.S. trade balance is not, macroeconomically speak-
ing, very interesting, for political reasons it has taken on heightened visibil-
ity.24 We can apply our estimates to answering the question of what would 
happen in response to a 10 percent appreciation of the RMB against the 
USD. Because both export and import and price elasticities are approxi-
mately unity (see column three in tables 7.7 and 7.8), this implies the China-
  U.S. trade balance would respond fairly strongly to RMB appreciation. 
Assuming unitary elasticities, the 2006 trade balance of 229.3 billion (2000$) 
would fall to 195.9 billion, or by 33.4 billion. Of course, this does not mean 
that the overall U.S. trade deﬁ  cit would shrink. In fact, the deﬁ  cit could be 
reallocated to other countries, even as the Chinese surplus with the United 
States fell.
Interestingly, our estimate is not that far away from Thorbecke’s (2006) 
estimate of a long-  run decrease of 29 billion dollars in response to a 10 
percent appreciation in 2005.
The ex-  U.S. trade-  weighted exchange rate (q ˜) should capture the eﬀect 
of the changes in the value of the RMB relative to the currencies of other 
countries that also export to the United States. Unfortunately, the point 
estimate is not statistically signiﬁ  cant at conventional levels. Hence, one can 
take the foregoing calculation in either of two ways. First, it assumes that 
the RMB moves against the U.S. dollar, while holding its position relative 
to its trading partners constant—that is, other countries aside from the 
United States move their currencies in line with China’s. Second, the other 
country eﬀect is absent.
7.5    Concluding  Thoughts
This study has aimed to illuminate some of the determinants of the Chi-
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25. This is cogently discussed in Frankel (1990).
26. Marquez observes that assuming a constant income elasticity of imports while the 
import-  GDP ratio increases over time presupposes a very speciﬁ  c behavior for the marginal 
propensity to import. An alternative is to impose a constant marginal propensity to import and 
retrieve the implied time varying income elasticities.
pirical record, we have highlighted one particularly important fact: many of 
the empirical relationships that can be identiﬁ  ed are of a tenuous nature.
Turning ﬁ  rst to the real value of the RMB, we reiterate the ﬁ  ndings of 
Cheung, Chinn, and Fujii (2007b)—namely that the relationship between 
real per capita income and the real value of a currency in PPP terms is 
quite diﬀuse. We can be quite certain that a relationship exists, but the exact 
magnitude of the slope coeﬃcient is subject to substantial uncertainty. And 
this is even before one adds in model uncertainty and measurement error, 
the latter of which has been spectacularly demonstrated as being of conse-
quence. Hence, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no undervaluation 
at conventional levels of statistical signiﬁ  cance. Of course, it is critical to 
remember that the failure to reject a null is not the same as acceptance of the 
null hypothesis.25 Even now, with the beneﬁ  t of updated Chinese price and 
income data, we could also not reject the null that the RMB was 40 percent 
undervalued.
The same characterization applies to our ﬁ  ndings regarding trade elas-
ticities, perhaps even more so than in the case of the exchange rate. That 
outcome occurs for a number of reasons, in our view. First, in the approach 
adopted, we rely solely upon a single country’s data, rather than appealing 
to cross-  country data. Second, the data pertain to an economy experienc-
ing rapid structural changes. These structural changes include a rapid build 
up in the capital stock, motivating our use of a proxy measure of China’s 
supply capacity.26
We also freely acknowledge that our approach, while fully in the spirit of 
conventional approach, may miss some important aspects of China’s recent 
macroeconomic behavior. In particular, some observers have noted that the 
decline in import growth during the 2005 to 2006 period was associated 
with a decline in consumption, which, in turn, has been driven by a declin-
ing disposable income-  GDP ratio and a rising saving-  disposable income 
ratio (International Monetary Fund 2006). Because consumption behavior 
clear aﬀects imports and exports, omission of this factor is something to be 
examined in subsequent work.
With these caveats in mind, we conclude that there is some evidence that 
Chinese trade ﬂ  ows respond to changes in real exchange rates—as well as 
income levels. However, the price elasticities do not appear reliably esti-
mated, and some estimates are counterintuitive.
Our bottom line conclusion regarding the estimated elasticities is that 
the real exchange rate eﬀect on overall trade ﬂ  ows—using typical point China’s Current Account and Exchange Rate    2 6 7
estimates—is relatively small and sometimes goes in the direction opposite 
of anticipated. Using some plausible estimates and zeroing out perverse esti-
mates, we obtain for a 10 percent RMB real appreciation a 46 billion (2000$) 
reduction in the Chinese trade balance, which, while not inconsequential, is 
still not tremendously large when measured against a 2006 balance of 401 
billion (2000$).
These ﬁ  ndings suggest that exchange rate policy alone will not be suﬃcient 
to reduce the Chinese trade surplus, especially when taken in the context 
of a trend increase in China’s manufacturing capacity. Depending upon 
which speciﬁ  cation is selected, slower growth in the rest of the world could 
have substantial impact on Chinese exports. With less circumspection, one 
can assert that slower growth in the United States would have a substantial 
impact on the U.S. trade deﬁ  cit with China.
Appendix
Data Appendix
The data used for the real exchange rate portion of the paper (section 7.3) 
were drawn from a number of diﬀerent sources. For most countries, data 
were available from 1971 through 2006 and drawn from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (2007 and 2008 editions). Taiwanese data are 
drawn from the Central Bank of China; International Center for the Study 
of East Asian Development (ICSEAD); and Asian Development Bank, Key 
Indicators of Developing Asian and Paciﬁ  c Countries (through 2005).
The data used for the trade elasticities portion of the paper (section 7.4) 
are drawn from a variety of sources.
￿   O ﬃcial exchange rates from IMF International Financial Statistics and 
“swap rates” from personal communication with John Fernald.
￿    Total Chinese exports and imports, from Chinese Customs, via CEIC.
￿   China- U.S. trade ﬂ  ows, from China Customs, via CEIC, and from U.S. 
BEA/Census via Haver.
￿   Price  deﬂ  ators from various sources.
￿    U.S. CPI-  all and PPI (ﬁ  nished goods), from U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, via Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) II.
￿   Overall price indexes for Chinese exports and imports, and category-
 speciﬁ  c price indexes, in USD terms, as described in Gaulier, Lem-
oine, and Ünal- Kesenci (2006); personal communication from Guil-
laume Gaulier.
￿   Price indexes for U.S. imports from China, East Asian Newly Indus-
trializing Countries (NICs), from Bureau of Labor Statistics.268        Yin-Wong Cheung, Menzie D. Chinn, and Eiji Fujii
￿   Chinese real GDP seasonally adjusted (from CEIC). U.S. real GDP 
drawn from Bureau of Economic Analysis (June 28, 2007 release).
￿   The Chinese nominal and real trade- weighted exchange rates from IMF 
International Financial Statistics.
￿    The bilateral USD/RMB exchange rate adjusted for swap transactions 
was provided by John Fernald.
￿   Chinese CPI drawn from CEIC, updated using IMF International 
Financial Statistics year-  on-  year growth rates.
￿   The Chinese capital stock in manufacturing, as described in Bai, Hsieh, 
and Qian (2006), was provided by Chang-  Tai Hsieh. This series is 
assumed to grow by 12 percent in 2005 and 2006, and is interpolated to 
a quarterly frequency using quadratic match averaging.
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Comment  Jeﬀrey Frankel
When one reads in the second paragraph of this nice chapter, “there are 
very few studies that simultaneously assess the Chinese exchange rate and 
trade/current account balance,” one’s ﬁ  rst reaction is: “That is true; I won-
der why analysts haven’t addressed them together. This will be a useful 
contribution.” And the chapter does turn out to be a useful contribution; 
the authors do their usual careful job with the econometrics, while linking 
directly to some of the most important questions in international macro-
economic policy today.
One doesn’t have to read much further, however, before being reminded 
why quantitative research on the Chinese exchange rate and trade balance 
has been stunted. There are reasons to be pessimistic about getting good 
results econometrically. First, as the authors say, “the data pertain to an 
economy experiencing rapid structural changes.” Second, the exchange rate 
has usually been de facto ﬁ  xed, in the past under a dual exchange rate system 
and even today supported by capital controls. Neither the domestic ﬁ  nancial 
market, nor international capital ﬂ  ows, nor the exchange rate itself are deter-
mined by market forces. Flexibility in the nominal exchange rate has been 
so low and the current “misalignment” probably so high, that there is little 
hope in estimating an econometric equation to determine the exchange rate. 
According to some theories, one gets the same real exchange rate regardless 
of the regime: if nominal ﬂ  exibility is suppressed, then fundamentals show 
up in the price level instead. But we know that, in practice, if a country like 
China holds the nominal exchange rate ﬁ  xed at a time, it will prevent or at 